A dispute among U.S. intelligence officers, over the strength of enemy forces in South Vietnam in 1967, had its first public exposure on March 19, 1968, when The New York Times published an article based on documents that Daniel Ellsberg had leaked to reporter Neil Sheehan. A more extended account, written by former CIA analyst Samuel Adams, appeared in 1975. The House Select Committee on Intelligence [the "Pike Committee"] held hearings on the issue late in 1975 (see U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community). It was the subject of a major television documentary in 1982, which led to a major lawsuit in which General William Westmoreland sued Samuel Adams, the CBS Television Network, and several CBS employees. The trial in late 1984 and early 1985 led to the release of a huge amount of information about U.S. intelligence, Communist forces, the background to the Tet Offensive, and other matters.
Sam Adams, "Vietnam Cover-up: Playing War with Numbers", Harper's, May 1975. Charges by a former CIA analyst that U.S. intelligence, especially MACV intelligence, deliberately underestimated enemy strength in Vietnam in order to maintain optimism about the way the war was going. The text has been placed on-line in the Virtual Vietnam Archive of the Vietnam Project, at Texas Tech University, as pp. 158-171 of Reassessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, a 1975 hearing before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, House International Relations Committee.
Samuel A. Adams, oral history interview, September 20, 1984. 68 pp. The interview was conducted by Ted Gittinger, of the LBJ Presidential Library, and is part of the Oral History Collection of the LBJ Presidential Library, but it has been placed online in the Lyndon B. Johnson Oral History collection at the Miller Center for Public Affairs, University of Virginia.
Sam Adams, introduction by Col. David Hackworth, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1994. 251 pp. The full text is available online to paid subscribers of Questia. This extremely valuable book is seriously incomplete. Sam Adams died in 1988, and his widow wisely decided to publish the manuscript as he had left it, rather than allow someone else to write new material to fill in the gaps. See review by Peter Braestrup, in Washington Post Book World, 5/8/94, p. 8; the review is naively accepting of the official version of the events.
"The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception" was a documentary broadcast
by CBS on January 23, 1982. It was, in essence, the television presentation
of Samuel Adams' charges about distortion of military intelligence reporting.
It restated Adams' old charges in regard to the dropping of certain categories
from the official order-of-battle figures, and added new charges (based
on research Adams did after writing his 1975 article) that MACV figures
also underestimated the rate of NVA infiltration into South Vietnam for
about five months before the Tet Offensive. (See below
for full transcript.)
In establishing the sheer fact that intelligence estimates were deliberately distorted, this program does pretty well. It presents a great deal of convincing testimony from military intelligence officers who said that pressure from their superiors to hold down the estimates of enemy strength had made them compile official estimates that they themselves did not believe to be accurate. However, the program does less well in analyzing the implications and consequences of the problem.
First, it assumes far too readily that if crucial information was omitted from MACV official reports, then the White House was being kept in ignorance. CBS allowed its viewers to believe (once almost came out and told them outright) that the President was ignorant of matters that in fact the President seems to have known about.
"The Uncounted Enemy" did not openly deny General Westmoreland's claim that the Tet Offensive had been in military terms an American victory, but it discussed that claim in a fashion designed to raise doubts. This was not proper; there had been good reason to doubt Westmoreland's claim at the time he made it, in 1968, but by 1981, when this documentary was made, the fact that Tet really had been an American military victory had become clear.
Finally, there have been questions about the fairness of the program. Its makers, presumably noticing the obvious logic that a successful conspiracy to distort intelligence reporting implies both a lot of conspirators who will presumably attempt to conceal what they have done, and a lot of victims who were successfully persuaded that the reports they were getting were honest, tended to discount in advance those witnesses who said there had been no distortion of intelligence reporting. CBS did not interview all those it should have interviewed, and it did not give much air time to those who said there had been no distortion of intelligence reporting. Exercising this sort of judgment is generally considered a violation of proper journalistic procedure. On the other hand, the evidence that has emerged since the program was broadcast indicates that CBS's judgment was good. The people who were given the most air time in the CBS program were in fact the ones who were describing the events accurately.
Renata Adler, Reckless Disregard: Westmoreland v. CBS et al.; Sharon v. Time. New York: Vintage, 1988. 245 pp. Previously published as "Annals of Law: Two Trials," in the New Yorker magazine, June 16, 1986, pp. 42-96, and June 23, 1986, pp. 34-83. From the brief glance I have taken at this book, Adler seems to be seriously biased, and to lack an understanding of even the most elementary issues involved in the Westmoreland/CBS trial.
Burton Benjamin, Fair Play: CBS, General Westmoreland, and How a Television Documentary Went Wrong. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. xviii, 218 pp. This account is by the man CBS assigned to handle its internal investigation of the documentary "The Uncounted Enemy". I have not seen it, but my impression is that it is concerned more with the question of whether the documentary followed proper journalistic procedures that with whether it was accurate.
Brian D. Blankenship, "A Deceptive Estimate? The Politics of Irregular Troop Numbers in Vietnam", Journal of Intelligence History, 12:2 (2013), pp. 93-112. I have skimmed this briefly; it did not look very good.
Jake Blood, The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War. New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2005. xv, 212 pp.
David Boies, Courting Justice: From NY Yankees v. Major League Baseball to Bush V. Gore 1997-2000. New York: Hyperion/Miramax Books, 2004. 490 pp. A short section near the beginning (pp. 18-23) deals with Boies' work as the lead attorney in CBS' defense against Westmoreland's libel suit.
Bob Brewin & Sydney Shaw, Vietnam on Trial: Westmoreland vs. CBS. New York: Atheneum, 1987. 414pp. The bulk of this book is a journalistic account of the Westmoreland/CBS dispute, pretty competently done except for a tendency simply to present the evidence, without enough analysis. (There are, however, surprising inaccuracies in regard to the "Viet Cong Infrastructure".) About 80 pages are devoted to interesting information about the war that came out in the trial but had little connection with the issues in the trial, especially dealing with the Ho Chi Minh Trail and US efforts to block it, and with McNamara's pessimism about the war.
Richard M. Clurman, Beyond Malice: The Media's Years of Reckoning, rev. ed. New York: Meridian (New American Library), 1990. 325 pp. A large portion of the book is devoted to Westmoreland v. CBS.
Thomas L. Cubbage III, "Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands?" in Michael I. Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), pp. 118-180. An anti-CBS view by a former military intelligence officer. There is also some discussion of this issue in the introductory essay to the volume, Michael I. Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence" (pp. 3-39).
Karen Donovan, v. Goliath: The Trials of David Boies. New York: Vintage, 2007. David Boies was the lead attorney for CBS in Westmoreland lawsuite. This book has about thirty pages on the case.
James P. Finley [command historian for the U.S. Army Intelligence Center], "Nobody Likes to be Surprised: Intelligence Failures," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 20:1 (January-March 1994), pp. 15-21, 40. The text is online at Hathi Trust.
Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, Confessions of a Cold Warrior. Fairfax, VA: Preview Press, 1995. 228 pp. Graham held a senior position in MACV intelligence in late 1967. The part of this book at which I have looked, the discussion of the 1967 dispute over enemy strength estimates and the 1968 Tet Offensive (pp. 51-57), appears to me to be nonsense.
Gains Hawkins, Mississipian, Roman, Soldier, Writer, Yoda, Dad. Salisbury, MD: Evans-Coates, 1989.
Gains Hawkins, "Vietnam Anguish: Being Ordered to Lie," Washington Post, November 14, 1982, C1, C2. Colonel Hawkins was head of the Order of Battle Branch at the Comobined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) for most of 1967.
C. Michael Hiam, Who the Hell Are We Fighting? The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars. Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press, 2006. 326 pp. Reprinted with a new Foreword by Thomas Powers, and under a new title, A Monument to Deceit: Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars. ForeEdge (University Press of New England), 2014.
Ed Joyce, Prime Times, Bad Times. New York: Doubleday, 1988. xii, 561 pp. Edward M. Joyce was President of CBS News during the trial of the Westmoreland lawsuit. He is more interested in procedural issues than with the truth or falsehood of the broadcast.
Bruce Jones, War without Windows. New York: Vanguard, 1987. xvi, 302 pp. By a junior officer who worked in military intelligence in Saigon 1967-68.
Don Kowet, A Matter of Honor. New York: Macmillan, 1984. 317pp. This is a full-length attack on the CBS documentary "The Uncounted Enemy." Kowet's lack of knowledge of the issues dealt with in the documentary, when added to his biases, make the book pretty worthless.
Grace Ferrari Levine, "Television Journalism on Trial: Westmoreland v. CBS", Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 5:2 (1990), pp. 102-116.
"Masters of the Intelligence Art: John F. Stewart, Jr. and the Vigilant Eye of the Storm." Published electronically on the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Center Huachuca History Program web site. 35 pp. Stewart (and the author of this article) sided with Westmoreland in the dispute over the 1967 estimates of the strength of enemy forces in Vietnam (see below for Stewart's testimony as a witness for Westmoreland, in Westmoreland's suit against CBS). Stewart later was involved with Urgent Fury and Just Cause. The biggest portion of the article deals with Desert Storm.
"Masters of the Intelligence Art: Phillip B. Davidson, Jr. and Army Intelligence Doctrine." Published electronically on the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Center Huachuca History Program web site. 10 pp. The author of this article has a higher opinion than I do of Davidson, who was chief of the Plans and Estimates Branch of Douglas MacArthur's intelligence staff during the Korean War, and headed military intelligence in Saigon 1967-1969. (See below for Davidson's testimony as a witness for Westmoreland, in Westmoreland's suit against CBS).
Edwin E. Moise, "Why Westmoreland Gave Up." Pacific Affairs 58:4 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 663-673. If you browse the Internet through an institution that has subscribed to JSTOR, you can access the text directly or go through the JSTOR Pacific Affairs browse page.
Edwin Moïse, The Myths of Tet: The Most Misunderstood Event of the Vietnam War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas (forthcoming 2017). Much of this book is devoted to the order of battle dispute, and to what the heavy combat of 1968, starting with the Tet Offensive, revealed about Communist strength.
Lt. Col. Evan H. Parrott, Jr., "CBS News, General Westmoreland, and the Pathology of Information", Air University Review, September-October 1982.
Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel. Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1986.
M. Patricia Roth, The Juror and the General. New York: William Morrow, 1986. 300 pp. By one of the jurors at the trial of Westmoreland v. CBS, et. al.
Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011. ix, 263 pp. An analysis, which looks quite convincing to me, of the reasons why policymakers sometimes politicize intelligence, and sometimes just ignore intelligence analyses that contradict their views. Much of Chapter 4, "The Johnson Administration and the Vietnam Estimates" (pp. 49-88), deals with the Order of Battle dispute.
Neil Sheehan, "U.S. Undervalued Enemy's Strength Before Offensive," New York Times, March 19, 1968, pp. 1, 3. Based on documents that Daniel Ellsberg (later to become famous in the "Pentagon Papers" case) leaked to Sheehan.
Frederick L. Shields, Preventable Disasters: Why Governments Fail. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991. xi, 204 pp. Analyses three "disasters", one of which is the Tet Offensive.
Rodney A. Smolla, Suing the Press. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 277 pp.
Josephine Stenson, "The Order of Battle Deception of the Vietnam War: 1965-1968". M.A. Thesis, History, Florida Atlantic University, 1990. v, 133 pp.
Mike Wallace, with Gary Paul Gates, Between You and Me: A Memoir. New York: Hyperion, 2005. 292 pp. Wallace's account of his role as chief correspondent for "The Uncounted Enemy," and as a defendant in Westmoreland's lawsuit, is on pp. 187-203.
James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. x, 290 pp. This book contains some useful information, but basically it is a whitewash of the intelligence failure.
James J. Wirtz, "Deception and the Tet Offensive", Journal of Strategic Studies 13 (June 1990), pp. 82-98.
James J. Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy During the Vietnam War", Political Science Quarterly 106:2 (Summer 1991), pp. 239-63. Starts out with the misunderstanding that "the Order of Battle debate . . . was driven by organizational definitions of who constituted an enemy combatant" (p. 241), and goes on to the suggestion, which I regard as preposterous, that the events of the Tet Offensive suggest that MACV estimates of enemy combat forces had actually been too large (p. 253). Reprinted in Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2004), pp. 183-197.
The Virtual Vietnam Archive of the Vietnam Project, at Texas Tech University, has placed online the full texts of many documents related to the Westmoreland lawsuit against CBS et al. (both declassifed intelligence reports and other documents dating from the war, and documents generated in in connection with the lawsuit). The items listed individually below represent only part of what is available. The best way I know of to search the collection is to go to the Virtual Vietnam Archive Quick Search Page, from there go to "Advanced Search," choose "Larry Berman Collection (Westmoreland v. CBS)" among the options offered for the "Collection Title" field, and then enter other terms as appropriate in the "Subject/Keyword", "Document Title", or other fields.
David Boies et. al., Memorandum in Support of Defendant CBS's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, 3 vols. Submitted May 23, 1984, to the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, in the case of General William C. Westmoreland against CBS Inc., et. al., 82 Civ. 7913 (PNL). This memorandum in three bound volumes contains a great deal of information, and full texts of sworn affadavits from various witnesses, in regard to the charge by CBS that US military intelligence in Vietnam deliberately falsified figures on enemy troops strength, especially in 1967. Appendix B, Affidavits Referred to in CBS's Memorandum, has been placed online:
Cover, table of contents, and pp. B-1 to B-45. Affidavits of Alexander Alben and George W. Allen.
pp. B-46 to B-95. Affidavits of Robert L. Appel, Birch E. Bayh, Jr, Thomas Becker, Burton Benjamin, Donald W. Blascak, and Francis A. Braccio.
pp. B-96 to B-139. Affidavits of Francis A. Braccio, George Christian, Richard M. Clurman, Russell Cooley, and William W. Cover.
pp. B-140 to B-177. Affidavits of William W. Cover, Howard Daniel III (this one is very interesting; Daniel was a computer analyst who supervised data processing operations at CICV for more than two and a half years beginning in early 1966), John I. Dickerson, Michael F. Dillay, and Aaron Donner.
pp. B-178 to B-208, and B-245 to B-259. Affidavits of David Elliott, Joseph A. Fackovec, Michael Fraboni, Dwain Gatterdam, and Gains B. Hawkins (who had been responsible for producing the Order of Battle in 1967). Pages B-209 to B-244, the significant part of which was the Affidavit of David Halberstam, appear to be missing.
pp. B-260 to B-298. Affidavits of Norman R. House, . . .
pp. B-299 to B-344. Affidavits of Bruce E. Jones, Richard Kovar, and Bobby E. Layton.
pp. B-345 to B-382. Affidavits of Bobby E. Layton, Marshall Lynn, Carl Marcy, . . .
pp. B-383 to B-429. Affidavit of Joseph A. McChristian, who as MACV J-2 from 1965 to 1967, had been Westmoreland's chief intelligence officer.
pp. B-430 to B-479. Affidavits of Joseph A McChristian, Paul N. McCloskey, . . .
pp. B-480 to B-529. Affidavits of David Morgan, Everette S. Parkins, Thomas Powers, and Kelly Robinson.
pp. B-530 to B-567. Affidavits of .
pp. B-568 to B-605. Affidavits of .
pp. B-606 to B-620. Affidavits of Joseph C. Stumpf and Thomas Thayer.
Dan M. Burt et al., "Plaintiff General William C. Westmoreland's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant CBS's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment," July 20, 1984. pp. i-xxvii, 1-22; pp. 23-60; pp. 61-102; pp. 103-151; pp. 152-203; pp. 204-253; pp. 254-303; pp. 304-353; pp. 354-365.
Dan M. Burt et al., "Plaintiff's Counter-Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 3(g) and Appendix B--Important Documents Cited in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion" (July 20, 1984?). pp. 1-41, pp. 42-76.
Appendix B, "Important Documents Cited in Support of Plantiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion"
Table of Contents, pp. B-1 to B-37. Includes transcript of the broadcast of "The Uncounted Enemy (JX 1, pp. B-2 to B-29), a melodramatic print ad for the broadcast (JX 385, p. B-31), and a transcript of discussion of the show on the CBS Morning News January 21, 1982 (JX 903, pp. B-33 to B-37).
pp. B-38 to B-56 (JX 375).
pp. B-57 to B-98. The Benjamin Report (PTX 2).
pp. B-99 to B-128. The Benjamin Report (PTX 2).
pp. B-129 to B-171. Sauter memorandum, July 15, 1982 (JX 372). MACV Monthly Infiltration Report, 8/1/68 (JX 197L, pp. B-140 to B-142); Letters from Gains Hawkins to his wife, 3/21/67 and 5/30/67 (JX 213C and JX 894, pp. B-144 to B-148); Excerpts from the February 1967 Honolulu Conference Report--One short excerpt on Communist loss rates, and one long table listing all the periodic reports that MACV issued containing information relating to the Order of Battle (JX 227, pp. B-150 to B-162); Memo, 3/12/67 from McChristian to Sandine (JX 229, pp. B-164 to B-166). Cable, 7/10/67, Carver to Helms (JX 245, pp. B-168 to B-171)
pp. B-172 to B-220. Includes Copies of MACV Vu-Graph slides from August NIE Conference (JX 248, pp. B-173 to B-193); Cable, 8/19/67, Komer to Carver (JX 250); Cable, 8/19/67, Davidson to Godding (JX 251, p. B-198); Cable, 8/20/67, Abrams to Wheeler, Sharp, and Westmoreland (JX 252, pp. B-200 to B-202); Cable, 8/20/67, Westmoreland to Wheeler and Sharp (JX 253, p. B-204); Cables, 9/11/67 and 9/12/67, Carver to Helms (JX 256 pp. B-206 to B-220).
pp. B-221 to B-272. Includes Cables, 9/12/67, 9/13/67, and 9/14/67, Carver to Helms (JX 258B, JX 259, and JX 260, pp. B-222 to B-239); Cable, 10/28/67, Bunker to Rostow (JX 267, p. B-241); SNIE 14.3-67, 11/13/67, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam" JX 273, (pp. B-243 to B-272)
pp. B-273 to B-318. Includes MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, 11/24/67 (JX 277, pp. B-274 to B-282); JX 287; Graham and Hamscher to Helms, mid-April 1968, disagreeing with the current CIA position on the order of battle (JX 312); Excerpt from the Pentagon Papers, USVNR, Book 5, IV.C.6(b), pp. 201-204, on the briefing given to McNamara when he visited Saigon in July 1967 (JX 317); George Allen, memo for the record on VC order of battle, 7/5/67 (JX 377);
pp. B-368 to B-415. Includes Westmoreland to Wheeler and Sharp 9 May 1968 on Order of Battle methodology, in which Westmoreland resisted the idea of counting the self-defense militia (pp. B-373 to B-375).
pp. B-416 to B-455. Includes "USMACV - JGS RVNAF Estimate of the Strength of Viet Cong Irregular Forces in SVN," 18 May 1967, presenting greatly increased estimates of Guerrilla, Self-Defense, and Secret Self-Defense forces, sent by McChristian to Komer 21 May 1967 (JX 893), and an evaluation of that study done by CIA at Komer's request soon after (JX 893A).
Deposition of Samuel A. Adams. [First portion of the deposition was apparently taken January 24, 1984.] Pages 3-46, 47-83, 84-103. May 21, 1984. Pages 104-126, 127-176. May 22, 1984. Pages 177-200, 201-222, 223-255, 256-295, 296-331. December 16, 1984. Pages 332-367, 368-411, 412-424, 425-466, 467-511, 512-552.
Affidavit of George W. Allen, August 25, 1983, 34 pp. Allen was a top CIA analyst of Vietnam.
Affidavit of Donald W. Blascak, March 2, 1984, 19 pp.
Deposition of Donald W. Blascak. In late 1966, he was at CIA under George Allen and George Carver, working on order of battle. February 3, 1985, pages 1-34, 35-81. February 4, 1985, pages 82-124, 125-157.
Deposition of William P. Bundy. June 20, 1984, pages 1-49, 50-94, 95-136, 137-178, 181-182, 187-190 [179-180, 183-186, and probably some others missing]. July 24, 1984, pages 191-237, 238-256, 257-306.
Deposition of George Carver. A senior CIA man. Pages 2-48, 49-88, 89-117, 118-149. November 29, 1983, pages 150-187, 188-219, 220-260, 261-277, 278-312, 313-339. November 30, 1983, pages 340-369, 370-414, 415-454, 455-489. December 1, 1983, pages 490-528, 529-571, 572-599, 600-648, 649-678. January 23, 1984, pages 679-715, 716-763, 764-802, 803-835, 836-869. January 24, 1984, pages 870-919, 920-960, 961-1005, 1006-1047. January 25, 1984, pages 1047-1090, 1091-1139, 1140-1164.
Affidavit of William E. Colby, November 11, 1983, 8 pp.
Deposition of William Colby. A senior CIA man; in 1967 he was head of the Far East Division of the Directorate of Plans. March 29, 1984, pages 1-33, 34-76, 77-113, 114-146. March 30, 1984, pages 147-184, 185-229, 230-262, 263-305.
Affidavit of Russell E. Cooley, March 7, 1983, 12 pp.
Deposition of Russell E. Cooley. February 14, 1984, pages 1-49, 50-94, 95-115. February 15, 1985, pages 116-156, 157-206, 207-221. February 16, 1984, pages 222-267, 268-316. April 13, 1983, pages 317-350, 351-373, 374-406. April 14, 1984, pages 407-440, 441-462, 463-501.
CBS Interview with Russell E. Cooley, 4/14/1981.
Deposition of Daniel A. Friedman. He was in the Army May 1967 to May 1969 rising to SP4. He was in Vietnam November 1967 to November 1968, in 3d Platoon [eight APCs], D Troop, 17th Armored Cavalry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, in III Corps. Later became a member of VVAW, and of VVA. December 13, 1984. 1-46, 47-83.
Deposition of General Robert N. Ginsburgh. He was an Air Force officer, who from mid 1966 to the beginning of 1969, had a double job, working both on the NSC staff under Walt Rostow, and on the Joint Staff. Before that he had served under Rostow in the State Department, on the Policy Planning Council. October 18, 1984, pages 1-45, 46-81.
Affidavit of David Halberstam, April 20, 1984, 35 pp. A journalist.
Deposition of Michael B. Hankins. December 5, 1983, pages 1-40, 41-61, 62-108. Hankins was drafted in March 1966. After basic training and advanced individual training, he went to Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, August 1966 to February 1967. He then went to the Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland. He was sent to Vietnam in June 1967, and was assigned to the Order of Battle Section at CICV, under Lt. Col. Parkins. He was there until his tour (and his service in the Army) ended in November 1968, working on NVA infiltration.
[Col. Gains Hawkins], "The Enemy Order of Battle in the Republic of Vietnam -- 1966-67." (Westmoreland v. CBS, Exhibit 1839.) A draft memoir, typescript with a lot of modifications marked in by hand, written by Col. Hawkins in 1980. pp 1-41, pp 42-58
Deposition of Col. Gains B. Hawkins. September 20, 1983, pages 1-45, 46-94, 95-132, 133-169; September 21, 1983, pages 170-213, 214-257, 258-293, 294-343; September 22, 1983, pages 344-367, 368-417, 418-448, 449-478; February 10, 1985, pages 479-522, 523-546; February 11, 1985, pages 549-573, 574-606.
Affidavit of Norman R. House, August (25?), 1983, 8 pp. An Army intelligence officer (recently transferred from the Air Force), he arrived in Vietnam in August 1967, joined the Estimates Branch of CIIED, and was assigned to find evidence that setbacks were forcing the VC in IV Corps to revert to phase I guerrilla warfare. When he reported the evidence didn't show that, he was transferred out. He became chief of Ground OB for I Corps at CICV, where there was pressure not to recognize new enemy units.
Affidavit of Robert W. Komer, April 19, 1984, 13 pp.
Affidavit of Richard D. Kovar, July 27, 1983, 16 pp. A CIA officer, who from 1962 to 1968 served on the executive staff of the CIA's deputy director for intelligence.
Affidavit of Marshall W. Lynn, March (23?), 1983, 5 pp. An analyst of enemy logistical units at the OB section of MACV intelligence, who in late August or early September 1967, was ordered to lower his estimates.
James Meacham. A naval officer who became chief of OB Studies at CICV in late fall of 1967.
Affidavit of James Meacham, October 3, 1983, 13 pp.
Transcript of George Crile's phone interview with James Meacham, March 30, 1981. 14 pp. (p. 12 missing). (This appears to be pp. 152-164 of JX 145.)
Letter no. 14, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 26 July 1967. JX 214Q.
Letter no. 21, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 6 August 1967. JX 214R.
Letter no. 28, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 15 August 1967. JX 214S.
Letter no. 29, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 16 August 1967.
Letter no. 30, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 17 August 1967. JX 214T.
Letter no. 32, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 19 August 1967. JX 214U.
Letter no. 35, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 23 August 1967. JX 214V.
Letter no. 36, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 24 August 1967. JX 214W.
Letter no. 37, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 25 August 1967. JX 214X.
Letter no. 40, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 28 August 1967. JX 214Y.
Letter no. 48, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 7 September 1967. JX 214Z.
Letter no. 54, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 13 September 1967. JX 214AA.
Letter no. 55, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 14 September 1967.
Letter no. 62, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 21 September 1967. JX 214BB.
Letter no. 70, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 29 September 1967. JX 214A.
Letter no. 73, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 2 October 1967. JX 214CC.
Letter no. 78, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 7 October 1967. JX 214DD.
Letter no. 80, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 9 October 1967. JX 214EE.
Letter no. 81, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 10 October 1967. JX 214FF.
Letter no. 84A, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 15 October 1967. JX 214GG.
Letter no. 86, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 17 October 1967. JX 214HH.
Letter no. 88A, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 20 October 1967. JX 214II.
Letter no. 90, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 22 October 1967. JX 214JJ.
Letter no. 92, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 24 October 1967. JX 214KK.
Letter no. 93, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 25 October 1967. JX 214LL.
Letter no. 94, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 26 October 1967. JX 214MM.
Letter no. 98, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 30 October 1967. JX 214NN.
Letter no. 102, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 3 November 1967. JX 214OO.
Letter no. 110, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 11 November 1967. JX 214PP.
Letter no. 114, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 15 November 1967. JX 214B.
Letter no. 120, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 21 November 1967. JX 214QQ
Letter no. 123, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 24 November 1967. JX 214RR
Letter no. 124, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 25 November 1967. JX 214SS
Letters nos. 128 and 128A, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 29 and 30 November 1967. (No. 128A is JX 214TT.)
Letter no. 147, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 19 December 1967. JX 214UU
Letter no. 164, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 6 January 1968. JX 214VV
Letter no. 173, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 15 January 1968. JX 214C.
Letter no. 212, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 2 March 1968. JX 214D.
Letter no. 213, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 3 March 1968. JX 214E.
Letter no. 223, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 13 March 1968. JX 214F.
Letter no. 230, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 20 March 1968. JX 214G.
Letter no. 231, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 21 March 1968. JX 214H.
Letter no. 231A, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 23 March 1968.
Letter no. 237, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 2 April 1968. JX 214N.
Letter no. 254, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 6 May 1968. JX 214O.
Letter no. 259, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 11 May 1968. JX 214I.
Letter no. 260, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 12 May 1968.
Letter (un-numbered), James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 1 June 1968.
Letter no. 281, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 1 June 1968.
Letter no. 282, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 2 June 1968.
Letter no. 283, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 3 June 1968.
Letter no. 284, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 4 June 1968.
Letter no. 285, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 5 June 1968.
Letter no. 286, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 6 June 1968.
Letter no. 287, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 7 June 1968.
Letter no. 288, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 8 June 1968.
Letter no. 289, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 9 June 1968.
Letter no. 290, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 10 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 11 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 12 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 13 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 14 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 15 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 16 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 17 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 18 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 19 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 20 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 21 June 1968.
Letter no. 302, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 22 June 1968.
Letter no. 303, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 23 June 1968. JX 214J.
Letter no. 304, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 24 June 1968. JX 214K.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 25 June 1968.
Letter, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 26 June 1968.
Letter no. 307, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 27 June 1968.
Letter no. 309, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 29 June 1968.
Letter no. 310, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 30 June 1968.
Letter no. 311, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 1 July 1968. JX 214L.
Letter no. 312, James Meacham to Dorothy Meacham, 3 July 1968. JX 214M.
Letter, James Meacham to Sam Adams, 10 June 1980. 1 p. JX 214P.
Deposition of Col. David Morgan. He was in military intelligence from 1955 to 1968. He had been primarily a Soviet analyst until his one-year tour in Vietnam, in J-2 estimates and CICV, January 1967 to January 1968. June 4, 1984, pages 1-37, 38-66, 67-115, 116-139.
Deposition of Douglas Joseph Parry. A CIA analyst on guerrillas and militia. August 24, 1983, pages 1-47, 48-88, 89-123. August 25, 1983, pages 124-170, 171-207, 208-252. August 26, 1983, pages 253-294, 295-334. January 12, 1984, pages 1-42, 43-82, 83-117.
Affidavit of Walt W. Rostow, March 6, 1984, 11 pp.
Deposition of Gregory G. Rushford. Rushford was an investigator for the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) in 1975 and 1976, when the committee investigated the order of battle dispute. November 14, 1983, pages 1-50, 51-94, 95-140. November 15, 1983, pages 141-189, 190-214, 215-242. January 9, 1984, pages 245-278, 279-298.
Affidavit of Ronald L. Smith, April 23, 1984, 24 pp. A CIA intelligence analyst. This affidavit has documentary exhibits attached to it: Exhibit A (comments by Ronald L. Smith, 13 November 1967, on the MACV press briefing of 11 November 1967), Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit D, Exhibit E,
Affidavit of Joseph C. Stumpf, April 18, 1984, 7 pp. A CIA analyst, who went to Vietnam in December 1967 to check on MACV figures on VC recruitment, and found that the MACV figures were being forced downward by command pressure.
Deposition of John Barrie Williams. September 27, 1983, pages 1-49, 50-90, ?-138, 139-173. Williams, an Army intelligence officer, first went to Vietnam August 1964 to August 1965 as an intelligence adivisor to the ARVN 21st Infantry Division; he was a Rach Gia. From February 1966 to mid 1969 he was an analyst on the Vietnam desk at DIA. In mid 1970 he went back to Vietnam, initially in the 2d Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Group, at Nha Trang; in December he became commander of the 4th Battalion of the 525th Group, at Can Tho in the Mekong Delta. In mid 1971 he was transferred to Thailand, where he worked for two years.
October 15, 1984: Walt Rostow: pages 213-248 (lawyers' discussions with judge), 249-292 (begin direct examination of Walt Rostow), 293-333, 334-373 (begin cross-examination), [page 374 missing], 375-410.
October 23, 1984. Pages 1096-1119 (statements by attorneys to the jury; begin direct examination of General Phillip B. Davidson, MACV J-2, 1967-1969); 1120-1160 (Davidson, direct examination); 1161-1187 (Davidson, direct examination; statements by attorneys to the jury, especially about James Meacham).
October 24, 1984. Pages 1189-1231 (Davidson direct and cross-examination); 1232-1263, 1264-1282, 1283-1330, (Phillip Davidson, cross-examination); 1331-1360 (Davidson cross-examination; interim summations by both sides).
October 25, 1984. Pages 1362-1401 (interim summations by both sides; direct examination of Commander Robert H. Heon, who was chief of the current intelligence section of MACV intelligence from February or March 1967 to February 1968); 1402-1443 (Heon, direct and cross-examination); 1444-1479, (George Godding, who as a colonel was chief of production for MACV intelligence for much of 1967, direct examination); 1480-1519 (Godding, direct and cross-examination); 1520-1533 (Godding cross-examination).
October 30, 1984. Pages 1722-1752 (discussion between attorneys and the judge, and statements by attorneys on both sides to the jury; begin direct examination of Everette Sandford Parkins, who was in J-2 MACV from January 1967 to January 1968); 1753-1798 (Parkins, direct and cross-examination); 1799-1823 (Parkins, cross-, redirect, recross, redirect examination; discussions with judge); 1824-1855 (General Daniel O. Graham, direct examination). A couple of pages seem not to have been scanned, at the end of this day's transcript.
November 1, 1984. Pages 2057-2093, 2094-2137 (General Graham, cross-examination); 2138-2164 (General Graham, cross- and redirect examination); 2165-2190 (General Graham, redirect examination; direct examination of Robert Leverone, a naval officer who was with the current intelligence division of MACV from October 1967 to September 1968); 2191-2229 (Leverone, direct examination).
November 5, 1984. Pages 2231-2263 (Leverone cross-examination; testimony by deposition of Michael Hankins, who had arrived in Vietnam in 1967 shortly after intelligence training at Fort Holabird, and began working at the Order of Battle branch at CICV about the beginning of July, working on NVA infiltration); 2264-2291, 2292-2336, 2337-2356 (Hankins, testimony by deposition); 2357-2399 (attorneys' statements to the jury; direct examination of John Frank Stewart, who began his Vietnam tour in March 1967, working on II Corps as an analyst in the Current Intelligence and Indications branch at MACV); 2400-2423 (Stewart, direct examination).
November 7, 1984. Pages 2572-2600 (Colonel John Stewart, cross-examination); 2601-2646 (Stewart, cross- and redirect examination); 2647-2691 (interim summations and attorneys' arguments). If the remaining pages for November 7 have been placed online, I have not yet located them.
November 8, 1984. Pages 2708-2750, 2751-2799, 2800-2811, 2812-2846 2847-2892 (George Carver, who had been Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs [SAVA] to the Director of Central Intelligence, direct examination).
November 13, 1984. Pages 3048-3089, 3090-3114 (George Carver of CIA, direct examination). 3115-3155 (George Carver, direct and cross-examination) 3156-3197, 3198-3229 (George Carver, cross-examination).
November 20, 1984. Pages 3795-3836 (William Bundy, direct examination); 3837-3882 (William Bundy, cross-examination); 3883-3931 General Westmoreland, direct and cross-examination; 3932-3959 (General Westmoreland, cross-examination).
December 3, 1984. Pages 4400-4449, 4450-4485, 4486-4518, 4519-4540 (General William Westmoreland, cross-examination), 4541-4580 (cross-examination, and discussions between attorneys and the judge), 4581-4603 (discussions between attorneys and the judge).
December 4, 1984. Pages 4605-4632 (General William Westmoreland, cross-examination); 4633-4661 (Paul Nitze, direct and cross-examination); 4662-4692 (Nitze cross-examination); 4693-4733 (Nitze redirect, Westmoreland redirect); 4734-4768 (Westmoreland redirect and recross).
On January 8, 1985, the attorney for General Westmoreland rested his case, and the attorney for CBS and the individual defendants began presenting their defense
January 8, 1985. Pages 6472-6520 (Westmoreland's attorney wraps up his case; defendants' attorney begins the defense case with testimony, by deposition, of Joseph Zigman [a CBS producer] and Dwain R. Gatterdam [a CIA analyst]), 6521-6565 (Gatterdam, continued).
January 9, 1985. Pages 6566-6615 (James P. Johnson, a Republican member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1973 to 1981, who had served in the Select Committee on Intelligence [Pike Committee] from 1975 to 1976), and David C. Morgan, who had been deputy chief of the order of battle section of U.S. intelligence in Saigon), 6616-6659 (discussion by attorneys of clips of videotapes, which were played to the jury but not transcribed for the trial transcript, of statements by Marshall Lynn and George Hamscher; beginning of testimony by George Hamscher, an intelligence colonel who moved from DIA to CINCPAC in the summer of 1967), 6660-6699, 6700-6716 (Hamscher, continued).
January 10: Pages 6779-6803 (beginning of testimony by Sam Adams, defendant and former CIA analyst).
January 23, 1985. The witness was George W. Allen, who had been a senior CIA analyst. Pages 7737-7784 and 7785-7826 (direct examination of Allen); pages 7827-7871 (direct examination of Allen concludes, cross-examination begins). There should be more pages for this date, but I have not located them.
January 24: 7914-7944, 7945-7971 (George Allen, cross-examination); 7972-7997 (George Allen, redirect); 7998-8017 (George Allen, redirect and recross); 8018-8042 (George Allen, redirect; Douglas Joseph Parry, testifying by deposition, who had been a fairly low-level CIA analyst on guerrillas and militia); 8043-8070 (Parry, continued).
January 28: 8072-8118 (Douglas Parry, continued), 8119-8138 (Parry, continued; John Dickerson, who worked for CIA January 1964 to January 1968, of which time he was in Saigon December 1965 to November 1967, doing analysis on enemy logistics), 8139-8156 (Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., a former Marine officer who was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, R-Calif, in a special election in December 1967, and immediately went on the first of several fact-finding trips to Vietnam), 8159-8187, 8188-8237 (McCloskey, continued),
January 29: 8239-8287 (Ronald Lee Smith, who had been Sam Adams' boss for a while at CIA), 8288-8327, 8328-8346 (Smith cross-examination), 8347-8365 (John Moore), 8366-8401 (Col. William Cover, who was G-2 of I Field Force March-August 1966, then was chief of estimates for MACV J-2 August 1966 to March 1967).
January 30: 8403-8445 (Ronald Smith, cross-examination and redirect), 8446-8494 (Richard Kovar [who from early 1963 to January 1, 1968, was an executive assistant to the DDI, working mostly on Vietnam--he was de facto the DDI's special assistant for Vietnam affairs], direct examination), 8495-8521 (Kovar, cross and redirect examination), 8522-8538 (the running heads at the tops of the pages claim this is still Kovar, but it isn't; it is testimony by deposition of Bernard Gattozzi, who arrived in Vietnam in September 1967, and was assigned to J-2 MACV, where he soon began working on order of battle methodology under Lt. Col. Everette Parkins), 8539-8575 (Gattozzi).
January 31: Pages 8577-8616 (Joseph Clement Stumpf, III, who had been a CIA analyst, particulary of administrative services), 8617-8653 (Stumpf, continued; interim summations by attorneys for both sides; begin examination of Greg Rushford, who had been an investigator for the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) in 1975 and 1976), 8654-8703.
February 4, 1985. The witnesses were: Daniel Friedman, who had served in Vietnam November 1967 to November 1968, as an armored reconnaissance specialist (11D20) with Third Platoon, D Troop, 17th Armored Cavalry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Howard Daniel Embree, USMA 1963, who served in Vietnam May 1966 to May 1967 as an adviser to units of the ARVN 1st Division (4th Battalion of 2nd Regiment, based at Dong Ha, for six months, then 1st Battalion of 1st Regiment, based at Quang Tri, for six months); he had had 12 weeks of intensive Vietnamese language just before he went. Joseph Fackovec, a film editor who had worked on "The Uncounted Enemy." Pages 8704-8734 (Friedman); 8735-8775 (Friedman and Embree); 8776-8804 (Fackovec); 8805-8833 (mostly attorneys for Westmoreland reading various materials including excerpts from the deposition of Howard Stringer of CBS).
February 5, 1985. Witnesses were Colonel Donald Blascak (an Army intelligence officer who had been working at CIA, under George Carver, from January 1966 to August 1968), and Colonel Russell E. Cooley (who had been Chief of the Enemy Strength Team, Order of Battle Studies, Order of Battle Branch, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, from October 1967 onward. Pages 8835-8869 and 8870-8899 (direct examination of Blascak); pages 8900-8931 (cross-examination, and direct questioning of Blascak by the judge); pages 8932-8980 (redirect examination of Blascak, and testimony by deposition of Colonel Cooley).
February 6, 1985, the day when General Joseph McChristian was testifying (both direct and cross-examination). Pages 8982-9021, 9022-9046, 9047-9082, 9083-9120, and 9121-9141. McChristian had headed U.S. military intelligence in Vietnam from 1965 to 1967.
February 11, 1985. Major Michael Dilley, who as a junior intelligence officer, had served in the political order of battle section of the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, September 1966 to September 1967. Pages 9339-9386 (Major Michael Dilley direct examination), 9387-9414 (Major Dilley direct and cross-examination), 9415-9441 (Major Dilley cross- and redirect examination, another segment of Colonel Cooley's testimony by deposition, and arguments over admissability of testimony of a guy named Olsen).
February 13, 1985. Pages 9568-9601 (lawyers' arguments over Hawkins' testimony), followed by 9602-9633 and 9634-9679 (cross-examination of Colonel Gains Hawkins), followed by 9680-9709, (direct examination of Norman R. House, an Army intelligence officer who arrived in Vietnam in August 1967, worked briefly in the estimates branch of the Current Intelligence Indication and Estimates Division (CIIED), then was in charge of the I Corps ground order of battle section at CICV, then on 15 February 1968 went to MACV Forward at Phu Bai), 9710-9734 (cross-examination and redirect examination of Norman House).
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Enemy Force Build-Up, Jul 64-Dec 65. Order of Battle Study No. 66-1. 18 February 1966; information as of 31 December 1965.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 16 Mar thru 31 Mar 66 (JX 198A, just cover and one page of summary tables).
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 May thru 31 May 66 (JX 198C, just cover and one page of summary tables).
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 June thru 30 June 66 (JX 198D, just cover and one page of summary tables).
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 July thru 31 July 66 (198E, just cover and one page of summary tables).
RVN Joint General Staff/RVNAF, J-2, VC Order of Battle South of the 17th Parallel (Up to 31 July 1966), No. 01784/TTM/TTQB/5, August 1, 1966. English translation by the MACV Combined Document Exploitation Center, Log #8-0714-66, August 10, 1966.
P.J. Schweitzer and J.C. Armstrong, with the assistance of A.L. Bottoms and L. Wainstein, under the supervision of G.W. Rathjens and H.W. Bode, "A Study of Data Related to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Logistics and Manpower." Institute for Defense Analysis, 29 August 1966. ii, 48, 31 pp. Probably produced by the "Jason Group" under IDA. Front matter and Part One: "Enemy Logistics in Support of Operations in South Vietnam", which includes considerable discussion of Market Time. Part Two: Accuracy of Estimates of VC/NVA Strength, Attrition, and Infiltration Rates", which includes OB estimates back to 1960, and a summary of the attitudes of various intelligence agencies toward the OB shortly before the beginning of the great OB debate of 1967.
RVN Joint General Staff/RVNAF, J-2, Summary of Viet Cong Order of Battle South of the 17th Parallel (As of 31 August 1966), No. 02132/TTM/TTQB/3, September 5, 1966. English translation by the MACV Combined Document Exploitation Center, Log #9-0793-66, September 17, 1966.
Robert N. Ginsburgh to Walt Rostow, "VC/NVA Order of Battle in SVN," 2 November 1966. 3 pp. Includes table breaking down estimated strength into confirmed, probable, and possible, and maps showing estimated locations. Ginsburgh was a colonel serving on the NSC staff as a JCS liaison officer.
Samuel Adams, "Viet Cong Irregular Strength", 7 November 1966. There were originally two attachments, but only one of these, "The Strength of the Viet Cong Irregulars," 8 September 1966 [also by Samuel Adams, though his name is not on it], is included in this online file. The other, COMUSMACV Report number 6 075 7739 66, 18 October 1966, (written by the American S-2 Advisory Team in Quang Tin Province), would be worth locating.
George A. Carver, Jr., "Revising the Viet Cong Order of Battle," 11 January 1967. 2 pp. JX 226.
Walt Rostow to President Johnson, January 20, 1967, Memorandum 6-3-37. Rostow informed President Johnson that in the fourth quarter of 1966, U.S. intelligence figures showed both Viet Cong main force units and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam to have declined in strength. (He attached a table of figures from "OSD sources," showing a greater decline in enemy strenght than was shown in the MACV OB Summary.)
Wheeler to Westmoreland, 20 January 1967, CJCS 0547-67. (JX669). Wheeler in concerned about inconsistencies in the ways data on infiltration, and Order of Battle, are reported. (Wheeler's concern appears to have been the impetus for the February 1967 conference in Hawaii--see below.)
Report of the Conference to Standardize Methods for Developing and Presenting Statistics on Order of Battle Information Trends and Estimates. Pacific Command, 21 Feb 1967 (the conference had been hosted by Pacific Command, 6-11 February 1967). ii, 30 pp. plus five annexes paginated separately. A sixth annex was issued as a separate document rather than as a part of this one--see below. Front matter, pp. 1-30, Annexes A-C Annex C (continued) to Annex E.
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Order of Battle Reference Manual - Strength. 12 February 1967. ii, 27 pp. plus annexes. (This reference manual was also Annex F of the item immediately above.) Front matter, pp. 1-27, Annex A (Retroactive Computation of Strength), Annex B (Rate of Growth of Infiltration Data Base), Tables 1-8, and Tables 9-11, Figure 2.
John Hart, Office of the Special Assistant [CIA], to Ambassador Lodge, 6 March 1967, on evidence that the Viet Cong are declining in strength. (Sent by Carver to Rostow 10 March 1967.)
CIA cable, Saigon to Director, 23 March 1967, on what some captured documents say about irregular strength, and related issues. (JX 704)
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 May thru 31 May 1967 (JX 198M, just cover and one page of summary tables).
CIA to Saigon, 2 June 1967. Responding to Saigon 7423. Samuel Adams to Louis Sandine, rejecting the idea of dropping the Self Defense and Secret Self Defense Forces from the Order of Battle. JX 239, JX 239B.
Westmoreland 5616 to Sharp, ""Revised Strength Estimate of Viet Cong Irregular Forces", 27 June 1967, JX [illegible].
Sharp to Westmoreland, ""Revised Strength Estimate of Viet Cong Irregular Forces", 14 June 1967.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 June thru 30 June 67 (JX 198N, just cover and one page of summary tables).
Westmoreland 7576 to Wheeler, 12 August 1967, JX 1605A.
Brigadier General Phillip B. Davidson, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, New Procedures for OB, 15 August 1967. JX 951A.
Robert N. Ginsburgh, Memorandum for Mr. Rostow, 18 August 1967. Ginsburgh reports that an agreement on the current order of battle seems imminent, and that it will be necessary to release retroactively adjusted figures for past years, so the new current figures can be accurately understood in perspective. He gives tables indicating what the current and retroactive figures are likely to look like. His retroactive table, apparently compiled by DIA, shows SD declining from 120,000 in December 1964 to 95,000 in July 1967, and SSD from 30,000 to 25,000.
Jim Jones, memo, 8/19/67, summarizing President Johnson's meeting 8/18/67 with Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, and Rostow. Mostly on bombing of North Vietnam, but some at the end on the strain on enemy forces.
Komer to Carver, 8/19/67 (JX 250)
Godding to Peterson, 8/19/67 (JX 769)
Abrams to Wheeler et al., 8/20/67 (JX 252)
Rostow to President Johnson, 8/22/67, summarizing a conversation between Rostow and Komer.
Godding to Davidson, 8/24/67 (JX 254)
Westmoreland to Wheeler, "Assessment of Progress by CTZ," MAC 8073 eyes only, 26 Aug 1967. A remarkably optimistic appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam. Pages 1-20, containing the discussion of III and IV Corps, and part of the discussion of I Corps, have been placed online.
Sharp to Wheeler, 262115Z Aug 1967, "Revision on Enemy OB Strength," (date stamp 28 Aug 1967 looks like when it was received somewhere, not when sent). Sharp endorses Westmoreland's message COMUSMACV 8068/251130Z Aug 67. There must be no mention of SD and SSD; if these are mentioned, then readers of the new figures will construct for themselves what the new figures would have been if SD and SSD had been included. JX 777.
Bunker to Rostow, 8/29/67 (JX 896)
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 August thru 31 August 1967 (JX 198P, just cover and one page of summary tables).
Carver to Bunker, 15 September 1967, "Agreement on Viet Cong Strength Figures" (JX 261)
Westmoreland to Deputy Ambassador Eugene M. Locke, Measurements of Progress, EMBTEL 7867, 14 October 1967. Reply, apparently written by MACOI and signed by Westmoreland, to Locke's request of 10/07/67 for information backing up statements in EMBTEL 7867. A lot of this is refutation of a Newsweek article "Their Lions - Our Rabbits". US and GVN KIA figures for April to August 1967, with CIDG and National Police included in the GVN figure, should be compared with other statistics. Has cover letter with which Locke sent it to Walt Rostow 10/26/67.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 October thru 31 October 1967. This was the first monthly summary produced after the radical changes to the definition of the Order of Battle decided upon in September. Front matter; Part I (Recapitulation of Accepted Enemy Order of Battle in RVN); pp. 1-11 of Part II (Accepted Enemy Personnel Strength) (pp. 27-28 of Part I give a really unbelievable graph of variations in VC and NVA combat strength in South Vietnam under the new definitions, by months since December 1964); pp. 12-16 of Part II; Part III (Accepted Enemy Unit Strength); pp. 1-28 of Part IV (Listing of Accepted Enemy Units) pp. 29-47 of Part IV; Part V (Infiltration Data); pp. 1-9 of Part VI (NVA/VC Unit AKAs and Cover Designations); pp. 10-16 of Part VI. Part VII (Viet Cong Political Infrastructure) does not appear to have been placed online. JX 939.
Ellsworth Bunker to Walt Rostow, 021000Z Nov 67, passed to President Johnson with a cover memo by Rostow dated November 2, 1967, on body counts and enemy losses in Vietnam.
Harold Kaplan to Walt Rostow, November 9, 1967. Secretary of Defense McNamara seems to want the revised Order of Battle figures released quickly. Kaplan is concerned that the figures be released in a way that will avoid unfavorable publicity.
Sam Adams, Memorandum for the Record, Comments on the Current Drafts of the Introductory Note and Texts of National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67, 11/9/67, Deposition Exhibit D-66. The scan is missing the last page. It might be worth checking to see if there is a complete scan as JX 269.
Statistics on the War in Vietnam. A compilation of bar graphs prepared by MACV. Sent to President Johnson with a cover memo by Walt Rostow, November 20, 1967. JX 284.
[Dick Moore? signature not very legible], memo to Walt Rostow, November 22, 1967, on the changes in the Order of Battle.
[William Hyland? signature not very legible], "Vietnamese Communist OB,", received by SAVA 24 Nov 67. A table, obtained from DIA, of the retroactive figures Westmoreland was using in his background briefing of the press [it looked like a regular briefing, not background, in Neil Sheehan's article about it, New York Times, November 23, 1967, pp. 1, 2].
MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, November 24, 1967. 9 pp. A summary, released to the press, of the revised estimate of enemy strength that had appeared in the October Order of Battle Summary (above) and in Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67, of November 13, 1967. JX 277.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Z. Henkin, to Director, CIA (Attn: George Carver), "MACV Press Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle," October 10, 1967. (JX263). A draft that had already been accepted by ASD(PA), COMUSMACV, and Robert Komer. Henkin asked for CIA comment or concurrence.
Paul V. Walsh to George Carver (SAVA), "MACV Press Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle", 11 October 1967. (JX 265A.) Walsh objected very strongly to the draft MACV press briefing. Walsh said it gave the impression that in the past the United States had overestimated guerrilla strength.
A later draft of this briefing, with a date I can't read, but according to the TTU search engine it was October 25, 1967.
A later draft of this briefing, dated November 6, 1967 (what has been put online looks incomplete).
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, MACV, Current Summary of Enemy Order of Battle in Laos, 15 December 1967.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 November thru 31 December 1967. JX 198SS.
CINCPAC to JCS, "Year-End Review of Vietnam," 010156Z Jan 68. The text. Said that the balance had shifted against the Communist forces "to an extent which denies the enemy the capability to conduct significant operations in the populated areas." (p. 2)
CINCPAC, "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, as of 31 December 1967." Commander in Chief, Pacific, CINCPAC SER: 00404 - 68. 23 February 1968. A quarterly report covering the last quarter of 1967. Front matter and pp. 1-40.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 January thru 31 January 1968. JX 198TT.
SAVA (George Carver) to [CIA] Saigon, Director 75802, 18 February 1968. (JX 296A.) Carver thinks the CIA should re-open the arguments that had been made in 1967 about dropping categories from Order of Battle.
CIA Director 762 to [CIA] Saigon, 200044Z Feb 1968, Ref: [CIA] Saigon 8836. CIA Headquarters says that the MACV study "Cost and Impact upon Enemy of Tet Offensive" is exaggerating the impact of the Tet Offensive on enemy forces. The MACV OB at the end of January was seriously underestimating enemy forces, so subtracting enemy losses since that time from that OB will produce an invalid result. The MACV OB omitted a lot of the units that participated in the Tet Offensive. JX 297A. A draft of this message dated February 19 is also available.
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, MACV, Current Summary of Enemy Order of Battle in Laos, 20 Feb 1968.
CINCPAC, "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 31 Dec 1967." CINCPAC Ser: 00404-68, 23 February 1968. The estimate on p. 9 that VC/NVA strength had declined 22% in 1967 is ironic in retrospect. Front matter and pp. 1-40 (less than half the total report).
Samuel A. Adams, Memorandum of Conversation, Colonel Gains Hawkins, US Army; Samuel Adams, OER/I/SV, Fort Holabird, MD, 27 February 1968. Detailed discussion of the OB.
Robert N. Ginsburgh to Walt Rostow, Enemy Order of Battle, 28 February 1968. Ginsburgh gave his personal estimate of changes in enemy strength since October 1967. Cover Memo with which Rostow forwarded Ginsburgh's memo to President Johnson, with the comment "His estimating record in the past has been good."
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 February thru 29 February 1968.
Comments on MACV's Post-Tet OB, 18 March 1968. 6 pp.
Robert N. Ginsburgh to Walt Rostow, Order of Battle, 20 March 1968. DX 929.
Robert N. Ginsburgh to Walt Rostow, Enemy Order of Battle, 27 March 1968. The CIA is currently giving a substantially higher estimate than the DIA for enemy combat forces in South Vietnam. A lot of the difference traces back to differences in the figures for past strength. DIA assumes that enemy strength in November 1967 was 118,000, the figure on which the intelligence community agreed at that time. The CIA now thinks the figure was 142,000 in November 1967.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 March thru 31 March 1968.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 April thru 30 April 1968.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 May thru 31 May 1968 (just cover and one page of summary tables).
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 June thru 30 June 1968.
Interviews with Senior Captain Phan Van Xuong, North Vietnamese Army, July 3, 1968. Xuong had inherited command of the Quyet Thanh Regiment, based in Cu Chi and Go Mon Districts, when the previous commander was killed May 31, 1968, on the outskirts of Saigon. He ralied June 17. Very inteesting.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 Thru 31 July 1968.
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, MACV, Current Summary of Enemy Order of Battle in Laos, 15 Aug 1968.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 Thru 31 Aug 1968.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 September thru 30 September 1968.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 Thru 31 October 1968.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, 1 August thru 31 October 1968.
Samuel A. Adams, "Intelligence Failures in Vietnam: Suggestions for Reform." Memorandum, 24 January 1969, written when Adams was still in the CIA. The text.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, February 1970.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, September 1970.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, December 1970.
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Order of Battle Summary, June 1972.
[John Huizenga? Abbot Smith?], "1967's Estimative Record—Five Years Later", CIA Office of National Estimates, 16 August 1972. 34 pp. Released (sanitized) in 2015. This study takes a very vague, and very benign, view of the OB controversy.
COL Legro, Fact Sheet, AOSOP-I, 24 October 1973, Enemy Order of Battle in South Vietnam since Ceasefire. 3 pp.
Defense Attache Office, Fact Sheet, AOSOP-IX, 2 March 1974, Changes in Enemy Order of Battle in South Vietnam. 4 pp.
A private sector publisher has issued a huge microfilmed collection of documents from Westmoreland v. CBS et. al.
A private sector publisher has issued a very large microfilmed collection of MACV intelligence reports, including the complete texts of MACV Order of Battle Summaries from May 1967 onward (the links to Order of Battle Summaries above are only to excerpts, not to the complete texts).
Congressional committee hearings of 1973 and 1975 relating to the order of battle dispute can be found under Congressional Committee Documentation: Intelligence and Special Operations.
See also The Tet Offensive
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Copyright © 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, Edwin E. Moise. This document may be reproduced only by permission. Revised May 30, 2017. Opinions expressed in this bibliography are my own. They could hardly be the opinions of Clemson University, since Clemson University does not have opinions on the matters in question.